rfc9707v4.txt | rfc9707.txt | |||
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Internet Architecture Board (IAB) M. Kühlewind | Internet Architecture Board (IAB) M. Kühlewind | |||
Request for Comments: 9707 | Request for Comments: 9707 | |||
Category: Informational D. Dhody | Category: Informational D. Dhody | |||
ISSN: 2070-1721 | ISSN: 2070-1721 | |||
M. Knodel | M. Knodel | |||
January 2025 | February 2025 | |||
Report from the IAB Workshop on Barriers to Internet Access of Services | Report from the IAB Workshop on Barriers to Internet Access of Services | |||
(BIAS) | (BIAS) | |||
Abstract | Abstract | |||
The "Barriers to Internet Access of Services (BIAS)" workshop was | The "Barriers to Internet Access of Services (BIAS)" workshop was | |||
convened by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) from January 15-17, | convened by the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) from January 15-17, | |||
2024 as a three-day online meeting. Based on the submitted position | 2024 as a three-day online meeting. Based on the submitted position | |||
papers, the workshop covered three areas of interest: the role of | papers, the workshop covered three areas of interest: the role of | |||
skipping to change at line 425 ¶ | skipping to change at line 425 ¶ | |||
All speakers called for more transparency by requiring blocking | All speakers called for more transparency by requiring blocking | |||
messages as well as publication and auditing of blocklists. | messages as well as publication and auditing of blocklists. | |||
Potentially, even standardization could help. | Potentially, even standardization could help. | |||
2.3.2. Use of VPNs for Censorship Circumventions and User Expectations | 2.3.2. Use of VPNs for Censorship Circumventions and User Expectations | |||
Further on in the session, the possibility and prevalence of using | Further on in the session, the possibility and prevalence of using | |||
VPNs for circumvention were discussed, including user expectations | VPNs for circumvention were discussed, including user expectations | |||
and an analysis of security shortcomings of commercial VPN services. | and an analysis of security shortcomings of commercial VPN services. | |||
The analysis presented in [RAMESH-1] has shown various problems that | The analysis presented in [RAMESH-1] highlights various issues that | |||
lead to data leaks, such as leakage of IPv6 traffic, non-browser | lead to data leaks -- such as the leakage of IPv6 traffic, non- | |||
traffic, or tunnel failure, not upholding user expectations, | browser traffic, or failures in tunneling -- resulting in a failure | |||
especially when used in authoritarian regimes for censorship | to meet user expectations, particularly in scenarios involving | |||
circumvention or private communication. | censorship circumvention or private communication in authoritarian | |||
regimes. | ||||
The question of how common the use of VPNs for circumvention is and | The question of how common the use of VPNs for circumvention is and | |||
its legal implications, as VPNs are illegal in a few countries, was | its legal implications, as VPNs are illegal in a few countries, was | |||
discussed. For example, VPNs are not officially banned in India, but | discussed. For example, VPNs are not officially banned in India, but | |||
VPN providers need to store log data and those who haven't complied | VPN providers need to store log data and those who haven't complied | |||
stopped serving India. However, more data on VPN use and blocking | stopped serving India. However, more data on VPN use and blocking | |||
might be needed. | might be needed. | |||
2.3.3. Discussion | 2.3.3. Discussion | |||
End of changes. 2 change blocks. | ||||
6 lines changed or deleted | 7 lines changed or added | |||
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